

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DDS



30 August 1955

TO: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director (Support)  
SUBJECT: Staffing of Future Intelligence Officer Position Vacancies  
in DD/I and DD/P

1. PROBLEM:

To insure that the Junior Officer Training Program is utilized to its maximum capacity in staffing future intelligence officer vacancies created within the respective components of DD/I and DD/P.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. It is axiomatic that the effectiveness and security of the Agency's operations will depend upon the knowledge, experience and attitudes of the individual employees of CIA. Knowledge concerning classified activities of the Agency may only be acquired through training presented in organized courses of instruction or through carefully supervised on-the-job training and experience. From the time of its inception the Junior Officer Training Program has implemented both of these principles of instruction in the preparation of new employees for responsible positions within CIA. The concept that training is an essential prerequisite has been fully accepted by the military services, principal industries and all of the learned professions. This concept has been fully accepted by other civilian agencies of the government; for example, the Department of State has established a plan calling for three concentrated periods of training in the course of a Foreign Service Officer's career. A minimum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

of three months' training is required for a junior officer when he first comes into the Service; a second period of training is planned when the officer has reached mid career, after having served 5 to 8 years with the Department; and a final period of training as a senior officer following 15 to 20 years of service. This program is augmented by a number of special courses extending from a few weeks to a year in duration. In the first quarter of 1955 the Department launched an intensive drive to bring the opportunities of the Foreign Service before students in selected colleges and universities in all of the 48 states and Hawaii. This drive, known as Operation FSO6, was carried out by teams of Departmental officers familiar with the Department's organization and practices joined with a Foreign Service Officer who had recently returned from the field. The teams stressed the fact that future selection of officers in the Department and in the Foreign Service would be only through the FSO6 examinations and that every officer entering the enlarged Foreign Service would serve both at home and abroad.

- b. During fiscal year 1955, 414 professional intelligence officers in the grades of GS-7 and above were separated from the various components of DD/I and DD/P.
- c. During fiscal year 1955, 37 new Junior Officer Trainees entered on duty.
- d. On 31 July 1955, the Director established a personnel ceiling on the basis of the on-duty strength of the Agency as of that date. This measure reduced the authorized strength of the Junior Officer Training Program from 90 civilian positions to 60 and 150 military positions to 26, this being the on-duty strength of JOTs on 31 July.
- e. In addition to the 86 JOTs presently on duty with the Agency, 16 additional JOTs were on military duty outside of Agency jurisdiction, with readmission rights, and 39 personnel actions were in various stages of processing for new JOTs.
- f. In the event that the attrition of professional intelligence officers in grades GS-7 and above continued at approximately the rate of attrition which the Agency experienced in fiscal year 1955, the present capacity of the Junior Officer Training Program would be totally inadequate to accomplish the staffing of all of the projected professional intelligence officer vacancies within DD/I and DD/P.
- g. Taking into account the factor of promotion in the professional grades of GS-7 to GS-17, it is anticipated that the majority of job vacancies in the intelligence officer category will develop at the GS-7 to GS-11 level.

-2-

~~SECRET~~

ILLEGIB

- h. The pattern of training for JOTs in preparation for their assignment to components of the DB/P has in the past varied with the individual

25X

1.

3. DECISION:

- a. The Junior Officer Training Program began without precedent 4 1/2 years ago. (Details pertaining to its membership are shown in Tab A.) This program established by the Director of Training has consistently adhered to the concept that the level of the Agency's effectiveness and security will continue to be improved through the induction of carefully selected, properly trained individuals. The program has called for a careful selection of college graduates with superior academic records. Each candidate considered for selection has been required to qualify physically for duty overseas and to meet the standards established for special intelligence security clearances. Upon selection the program has afforded each of its members an opportunity to receive all essential training prior to assignment to an operating component of the Agency.
- b. It is significant that the Foreign Service has within the past year developed a program for its expansion embodying all the principles of the Junior Officer Training Program. The Department has initiated active competition with industry and other governmental agencies in order to get university graduates into their service. They have adapted a program of testing and evaluation as the first step in the screening process, and they have provided a minimum of three months' training for the potential Foreign Service Officer prior to his assignment to duty. Perhaps even more significant is the Department's recognition of a program of development toward the future which is clearly reflected in the policy that all future entrants into professional careers in the Foreign Service will be through the PSOC examination instead of through lateral recruitment in the higher grades.


ILLEGIB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- ILLEGIB
- e. It is suggested that if the Agency is to continue to operate under an established personnel ceiling it then becomes increasingly important to staff operational position vacancies created through attrition with the type of individual produced through the Junior Officer Training Program. Full recognition is given to the fact that the full extended training period ideally requiring 12 to 15 months should not be continued at least until a reservoir of JOTs has been developed, sufficient to meet the continued requirements of the operating components of DD/I and DD/P.

A detailed analysis of the attrition of intelligence officers, grades GS-7 through GS-17, has been made. From this analysis certain categories of intelligence officers have been identified which logically demand the quality of replacement developed by the Junior Officer Training Program. A description of these categories with their incidence of attrition during fiscal year 1955 are as indicated:

25X1A

CATEGORIES WITHIN DD/PNUMBER SEPARATEDCATEGORIES WITHIN DD/INUMBER SEPARATED

Intelligence Analysts, dealing with such subjects as biographic, industrial, economic, military and other types of information.	28
Scientific Intelligence Officers, dealing with such subjects as electronic, biological, chemical, physical and other types of scientific intelligence.	20
Current Intelligence Officers, dealing with the subject of current intelligence.	5

While the total attrition in these categories amounts to 53 separations during the past fiscal year, this figure is considered only as an indication of possible future attrition. The factor of experience will, of course, present a more accurate picture in the future.

-4-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001900030019-0

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001900030019-0

~~SECRET~~

25X1A



In both of these cases this training will be exclusive of any instruction in linguistics or area knowledge.

- f. In the event that attrition in the categories described above continued in succeeding years at a rate even approximating the rate experienced during fiscal year 1955, it is estimated that it would take 3 to 4 years under an expanded program before the Office of Training could develop a reservoir of trained JOIs sufficient to meet the combined requirements of DD/I and DD/P. In view of the lead time necessary to recruit, select, test, and clear candidates for the Junior Officer Training Program combined with the additional time necessary to provide their essential training before assignment, this factor makes it even more apparent that this Program must be expanded if it is to be fully utilized. It is suggested that one means of establishing the number of JOIs the Agency should have on duty would be to establish a basic ceiling augmented by an annual factor commensurate with 80% of the number of separations in the intelligence and operations officer categories created during the preceding fiscal year.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

It is concluded that:

- a. The concept of providing carefully selected, properly trained individuals for assignment to professional positions within CIA is a concept fully recognized and acknowledged by governmental agencies, industry, and the learned professions.
- b. The Central Intelligence Agency operating under its present personnel ceiling should strive by every means to improve the effectiveness and security of its operations and that one of the obvious ways of accomplishing this goal is through the induction of carefully selected, properly trained, highly qualified individuals into all position vacancies created by attrition.
- c. The majority of position vacancies among the professional intelligence and operations officers of DD/I and DD/P will logically develop in the grade range of GS-7 through GS-11 in view of the established policy

-6-

~~SECRET~~



ILLEGIB

of promotion from within rather than lateral recruitment in the higher grades.

- d. The capacity of the Junior Officer Training Program should be gradually expanded by a more carefully planned application of selection criteria of candidates and through a reduction of the time required to complete the training patterns.
- e. The existing personnel ceiling imposed on the Junior Officer Training Program if not altered mitigates against its exploitation in the staffing of future position vacancies within DD/I and DD/P.
- f. The Central Intelligence Agency should fully utilize the Junior Officer Training Program as the best means of providing a reservoir of professional intelligence officers to be drawn upon by the operating components of DD/I and DD/P as position vacancies occur within the grade range of GS-7 to GS-11.

5. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

It is recommended that:

- a. The policy be established within CIA that DD/I and DD/P will utilize the Junior Officer Training Program to its maximum capacity in staffing future intelligence officer vacancies within the categories described above.
- b. The Director of Training be authorized to expand the Junior Officer Training Program in order to meet the future requirements of DD/I and DD/P.
- c. The present authorized strength of the Junior Officer Training Program be increased from 60 professional and 26 military positions to a strength of 125 professional and 50 military positions.
- d. That the Director of Training be authorized to recruit and enter on duty candidates for the Junior Officer Training Program in future years within a flexible personnel ceiling. This ceiling would be based upon a combination of the authorized strength plus 80% of the professional intelligence officer vacancies created during the preceding year.
- e. Any increase in the authorized strength granted for this program be made solely on the basis of the recognized need for additional JOFs and with the understanding that such an increase should not affect any other adjustments in the Office of Training personnel ceiling.
- f. Recognition be given to the fact that this program is primarily a training activity designed to ensure that the operating components of the Agency have a reservoir of properly trained intelligence officers ready for assignment. Accordingly this program be permanently placed under the direction and control of the Director of Training.

AMEX: TAB A

~~SECRET~~

-7-

Director of Training

FOIAb3b

TAB



**SECRET****TAB A**

The following statistics indicate the distribution of Junior Officer Trainees throughout the duration of the Program:

**Junior Officer Training Program****On-duty Strength as of 31 July 1955**

I. Regular Junior Officer Trainees		60
II. Officers in OCS Programs Attached to Headquarters		26
III. Members of OCS Program before Assignment to Headquarters		16
IV. JOT's on Board in EOD Process of Whom		8
a. OCS Candidate	1	
b. ROTC	2	
V. Candidates with T.S. Clearance Accepted		7
VI. Actions Initiated; No Date for EOD Set		21

**as of 31 August 1955**

VII. Allocation of Junior Officer Trainees		104
DDP	55	
DDI	9	
DDS	4	
Away in Military	19	
In Courses	9	
EOD Processing	8	
VIII. Regular JOT's Permanently Transferred of Whom		71
DDP	30	
DDI	34	
DDS	7	

**SECRET**